Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1949

Leon Shaw v. Orem City, Victor Durham, E. H.
Johnson, A. A. Richards, Woodruff Jensen, and
Philo Edwards : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
McCUllough, Boyce & McCullough; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Shaw v. Orem City, No. 7376 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1161

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

7376

IN THE SUPREME COURT
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vs.
OREM CITY, a municipal corporation and VICTOR DURHAM, E. H.
JOHNSON, A. A. RICHARDS,
WOODRUFF JENSEN, and
PHILO EDWARD~s, Councilmen
constituting the City Council of
said corporation,

Case No.
7376

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
HONORABLE WM. STANLEY DUNFORD
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
LEOX :-SHA\Y,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
ORE"JI CITY, a municipal corporation and VICTOR DURHA!I, E. H.
.JOHXSOK, A. A. RICHARDS,
WOODRUFF JENSEN, and
PHILO ED\YARDS, Councilmen
ronstituting the City Council of
~aid corporation,

Case No.

7376

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are found in the first four
paragraphs of plaintiff's complaint, which were admitted in defendants' answer and in a stipulation made
in open court between the parties, and are substantially
as follows:
That plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State
of Utah, doing business as a tavern operator in Orem
City, Utah, which business is duly licensed as required
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by law. That plaintiff's principal buBiness consists of
the sale of draught and bottled beer to the general public. That in connection with said business and incidental
thereto plaintiff sells to the general ·public such items as
candy, soft drinks, tobacco, cigarettes and cigars. (R.
1, 2, 31, 32).
That Orem City is a municipal corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of
the State of Utah. That the defendants, Victor Durham,
E. H. Johnson, A. A. Richards, Woodruff Jensen and
Philo Edwards, constitute the duly elected, qualified and
acting City Council of Orem City, Utah. (R. 1, 31, 32).
That for many years prior to May 29, 1947, that
is from approximately 1934 until May 29, 1947, the sale
and offering for sale of beer in Orem City waB permitted
and was lawful on Sunday. (R. 32, 43) That on or about
June 25, 1'948, said city council, relying on Sec. 15-8-84,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, passed Orem City Ordinance
No. 91, Section 1 of which reads as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any persons to
engage in the business of the sale of light beer
at retail in bottles or on draught within the corporate lin1its of Orem City on the firBt day of the
week commonly called Sunday.'' (R. 1, 5, 6)
That said ordinance became effective July 1, 1948. That
all other ordinances of Orem City relating to Sunday
closing have been repealed by the city council of Orem
City so that there is now no Orem City Sunday closing
ordinance prohibiting or making unlawful the sale, or
offering for sale, of any other item, service or commodity
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en Sunday except beer. That said Ordinance No. 91
prohibits the sale and offering for sale on Sunday of
beer only. (R. 12, 32)
That there are within the corporate limits of Orem
City approximately ten licensed beer dealers all but
two of which have draught beer licenses. That there
are within the corporate limits of Orem City a great
number of other businesses all of which may, and many
of which do operate in the usual manner on Sunday. That
included in such businesses are the following: Cleaning
establishments, bank, automobile service stations, garages, auto parts store, implement store, clothing store.s,
meat markets, grocery stores, drug store, pool hall,
furniture stores, motion picture theatre, ice cream parlor, confectionary. That this list of business is representative bt1t not all inclusive of the businesses which exist
within the corporate limits of Orem City and may or do
operate on Sunday. (R. 33, 45)
On September 3, 1948, plaintiff commenced the instant action under Chapter 64, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, Title 104, known as the Declaratory Judgment
Statute whereby plaintiff sought to have the ordinance
in question declared unconstitutional and invalid as being
in violation of the provisions of Article I, Sections 1,
2, 7, 11, 2·2, 24, 25, 26 and 27 ano Article XI, Section 5
of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and of Amendment~ 5 and 14 of the Constitution of the United States
of America. (R. 1, 3) The case was argued before the
lower court on the stipulated statements of facts contained in paragraphs 1 to 4 of plaintiff's complaint and as
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stipulated in open court. No evidence for or on behalf
of any of the parties was presented. On the 31st day of
March, 1949, the lower court issued its memorandum deeision and on the 8th day of June, 1949, final judgment
was entered against the plaintiff, in which judgment the
lower court upheld the constitutionality and validity of
said Ordinance No. 91. From this judgment plaintiff
appeals. ( R. 26-28, 35)
STATE~1:ENT

OF ERRORS
1. The court erred in holding that the provisions
of Section 15-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, do authorize or permit the enactment of the ordinance in question and do grant to respondents authority to enact said
0rdinance without being in violation of the provisions of
Article I, Sections 1, 2, 7, 11, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27, Article
XI, Section 5 and Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
2. The court erred in making its decision by reading
into the decision evidence which was not presented to
the court by either plaintiff or defendant and which
wa.s not agreed to by either plaintiff or defendant, which
evidence is as follows :
(a) That the ordinance in question does tend to
improve the morals; peace and good order of the community through its prohibition of the sale of beer on
Sunday. (R. 33)
(b) Reference to the unrestricted sale of 3.2 beer
(R. 25) and to congested traffic on Sundays in Orem
City. (R. 26)
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;). That the court erred in holding- that Ordinance
Ko. 91 is Yalid and constitutional and not violative of
the provisions of Article I, Sections 1, 2, 7, 11, 22, 24,
:25, 26, 27 and Article XI, Section 5 of the Constitution
of the State of Utah and of Amendments V and XIY of
the Constitution of the United States of America.
ARGUMENT
PROPOSITION I. THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SEC.
15-8-84, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1943, DO NOT AUTHORIZE OR PERMIT THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORDINANCE
IN QUESTION, BUT IF IT WERE TO BE SO CONSTRUED
AS TO GRANT TO RESPONDENTS AUTHORITY SO TO
DO, SAID SECTION 15-8-84 'WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 11, 22, 24,
25, 26, 27, ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 AND ARTICLE V SECTION 1, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
UTAH. (Statement of Error No. 1)

It is a well known general rule that "municipal corporations ·possess and can exercise only such power-5
as are expressly granted them, necessarily incident to
the powers expressly conferred, or essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation." (50 Am. Jur. Sundays and Holidays, Sec.
8) Therefore, the municipal government must legislate
reasonably with respect to the OBJECTS and PURPOSES to be accomplished otherwise such action will
be constrtted to be beyond its power and autho.rity.
Section 15-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, grants
the general power and authority to municipal corporations to:
''. . . pass all ordinances and rules, and make
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all regulations not repugnant to law, necessary
for carrying into effect or discharging all powers
and duties conferred by this chapter, and such as
are necessary and proper to provide for the safety
and preserve the health, and promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of the
property therein.''
It is appellant's contention that since the ordinance
as framed does not extend to all vocations and to the
sale of all merchandise except necessaries, it is not designed to effect the purposes for which limited police
powers are granted to municipalities.
This court in the case of GRONLUND v. SALT
I)AJ(E CITY, -U-; 194 P. 2d 464, at page 466, states as
follows: "THE PURPOSE OF SUCH STATUTES IS
TO PROTECT SOCIETY BY ESTBLISHING A COMPULSORY DAY OF REST." If such is the purpose
(Jf the Sunday Closing law, what difference is there between an employee working in a tavern and an employee
working in a grocery store, pool hall, automobile service
station, garages, automobile parts store, implement store,
furniture store, motion picture theatre, ice cream parlor,
confectionary, etc., to mention but a few of the businesses
that Pxist in Orem City. (R. 45) Certainly the labor of
a tavern employee is no more arduous than the labor
of some of the others.
In STATE v. MASON, 94 Utah 501, at page 508,
78 P. 2d 920, 923; 117 A.L.R. 330, this court stated:
''In order to see whether the excluded classes or trans-
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<1 Ction~

are on a different ba~i~ than those included,
"·e must look to the purpose of the act. The objects and
p11rposes of a laze prrsent the to11chstone fo.r determiwing
proper and improper classifirations." As stated by this
court in GROXLF~rn v. SALT LAKE CITY (cited
supra), the object and purpose of Sunday Closing laws
•' is to protect society by establishing a compulsory day
of rest.'' The employee of a tavern is as much in need
of that clay of rest as the employee in a grocery store,
pool hall, etc. How is "it promotive of the health, safety,
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the inhabitants of Orem City to prohibit the working of
employees of taverns while permitting the employment
of grocery store clerks, pool hall operators, icemen,
movie theatre employees, etc1 This court specifically
answered this question in GRONLUND v. SALT LAKE
CITY -U-; 194 P. 2d 464, at page 467, when it stated:
•'''lflether the purpose of the ordinance in
qPestion be comformable to the original purpose
of such acts, to protect religious observance of
the f-;ahbath or that of the protection of Society
by establishing a compulsory day of rest, it is not
clear why the prohibition of the sale of commodities is in furtherance of such purpose or object
and the prohibition of the various permitted commercial activities is not. It is difficult to conceive
why it is promotive of the health, safety, nwrals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants of Salt Lake City to prohibit in
effect the working of a salesman or saleswoman
on Sunday, while permitting employment of common laborers, artisans, stenographers and laundresses.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
"\Ve are not advised that the work of a seller
of haberdashery is so much more arduous than
that of a ditch digger as to require that the law
protect the former and not the latter from the po.ssihility of being employed seven days a week.
. . . As thus viewed and as gauged by the grant
o:f municipal power hereinabove referred to, we
find the prohibitions of the ordinance bear no
reasonable relationship to the objectives to be accomplished hy enactment~ n1ade pursuant to such
·grant. Of this ordinance, it can be said that,' there
is no fa~ir reason for the ~aw that would not require 'with errual force its extension to others which
it leares 'Untouched.' "
The objectives and purposes to be accomplished
by Sunday Closing laws as expressly laid down by this
court is, ''to protect society by establishing a compulsory day of rest."
(GRONLUND v. SALT LAKE
CITY, cited supra). The employee of a tavern is in
the same position as the employee of a grocery store,
pool hall, ice cream parlor, ete., and "there is no fair
re,ason for the law that would not require with equal
force its extension to groce.ry clerks, pool hall operators,
movie theatre employees, etc., which it le,aves untouched.''
PROPOSITION II. THAT THE LOWER COURT IN MAKING ITS DECISION READ INTO THE DECISION EVIDENCE WHICH WAS NOT PRESENTED TO THE COURT
BY EITHER. PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT AND WHICH
WAS NOT AGREED TO BY EITHER PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT. (Statement of Error No. 2)

The lower court in attempting to rationalize its
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decision read into the record eYidence which was not
presented to the court by either plaintiff or defendant
and which was not agreed to by either plaintiff or defendant. (R. 2;), 26, 33) The lower court at page 33 of
the record makes a finding of fact that the ordinance
in question does tend to improve the morals, peace and
good order of the con1n1unity through its prohibition
of the sale of beer on Sunday. There is not one scintilla of ev-idence that this is a fact. The lower court
at page 25 of the record speaks of the ''unrestricted
sale of 3.2 beer." There was no evidence produced and
none could be produced to show that appellant, a tavern
owner, is engaged in the "unrestricted s·ale of 3.2 beer"
or for that matter, that there is "unrestricted sale of
3.2 beer'' in the entire city of Orem. The assumptions
by the lower court as to the results from the "unrestricted sale of 3.2 beer" are ficticious, without evidentiary foundations and certainly not a matter of
"common knowledge." On the contrary it is common
knowledge that the sale of beer is rigidly governed by
state law. (Liquor Control Act, Title 46, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943.)
Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record or
otherwise to show that the burden of automobile traffic
in the city of Orem is any greater on Sunday than on
any other day of the week. (R. 25) Such reading of '
evidence into the record only demonstrates the lower
court's attempt to justify a predetermined result, rather
than base its decision on the evidence legally and lawfully presented by the parties to the dispute. As a
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matter of fact the automobile traffic in Orem City on
Saturday night far exceeds that which is present on
Sunday and yet the so-called ''unrestricted sale of 3.2
beer" is not prohibited on Saturday night. Based on
the lower courts reasoning the appellant should be able
to read this into the record on appeal on the theory
of the lower court's doctrine of "common knowledge."
Appellant submits that such evidence is equally as
ligitimate and admissible as that proposed by the lower
court.
PROPOSITION III. THAT SAID ORDINANCE IS INy ALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 1, 2, 7, 11,
22, 24, 25, 26, 27 AND ARTICLE XI, SECTION 5 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND OF
AMENDMENTS V AND XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. (Statement of Error
No.3)

Appellant further contends that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for the reason that it is arbitrary, discriminatory, and a denial of equal protection of the
laws.
The lower court placed great emphasis upon the
fact that no person or agency could sell beer on Sunday
in the city of Orem, therefore, there could be no unlawful
discrimination between persons similarly situated, could
not deprive persons of equal protection of the laws,
and does not violate the provisions of uniformity of
application. (R. 23) Appellant asserts that the lower
courts reasoning is without foundation. The lower
court stated (R. 22): "Through the licensing proviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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sions as set forth, and through stores and package agencies set up by the comn1ission under the statute, are,
thus, the only two means by which beer may be lawfully sold within this state.
'• If, then, the agency of the state could sell beer
on Sunday while the ordinance prohibited it within
Orem, the ordinance would be discriminatory in that
it did not uniformly affect per .sons similarly situated."
The lower court then cites 46-0-86 Utah Code
Annotated, 1943 which provides:
''X o sale or delivery of liquor shall be made
on or frmn the premises of any state liquor store
or package agency, nor shall any store or package
agency be kept open for the sale of liq1.wr: (a) on
any legal Holiday.''
Sundays are legal holidays under the provisions of 270-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, therefore the lower
court concluded that no person or agency could sell beer
on Sunday in Orem City.
Appellant contends that by the provisions of 46-0-45
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, the term "liquor" does not
include "light beer" and, in fact, the statute expressly
negatives the inclusion of the word "light beer" within
the term liquor. And, by the provisions of 46-0-45, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, "light beer" is expressly defined
as "beer containing not more than 3.2 per centum of
alcohol by welight." Therefore, if we correct the reasoning of the lower court in accordance with the law, the
Liquor Control Commission can sell beer on Sunday,
hence there is discrimination between persons similarly
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situated and the ordinance is void and unconstitutional.
(BRDADBENT v. GIBS'ON, 105 Utah 53; 140 P. 2d 149;
GRONLUND v. SALT LAKE CITY (supra, R. 22 and
23) ).
The ordinance i;~ further discriminatory between
persons similarly situated as the ordinance in question
prohibits any person to engage in the business of the
sale of light beer AT RETAIL on Sunday in Orem City
but permits others to sell light beer AT WHOLESALE
on Sunday in Orem City.
The sale of beer is by the Utah legislature, subject
to the provisions of the Liquor Control Act, made fawful
and legal. The sale of beer under the provisions of the
Liquor Control Act is made a "respectable business."
Certainly the courts of the state of Utah and the lesser
political bodies of the .state have no power or authority
to upset the mandate of the Utah Legislature. Whatever
concepts of right and wrong were used in determining
that beer could be sold legally within the state of Utah,
it is the Utah Legislature which makes such determination.
To single out a legal and respectable business and
say willy nilly that it shall not be allowed to operate on
Sunday is arbitrary and discriminatory and therefore
unconstitutional and void. (EDEN v. PEOPLE (Ill.)
161 Ill. 296, 43 N.E. 1109; CITY OF TACOMA v.
KRECH (Wash) 15 Wash, 296, 46 P. 255; EX PARTE
JENTZSCH (Cal) 112 Cal. 468, 44 P. 8023; SALT
LAKE CITY v. REVENE, 101 Utah 504, 124 P. 2d
537)
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This court stated in GROl!·lLUXD
CITY, 19-! P. 2d -!6-t, at page 468:

l'.

SALT LAKE

'"Even bearing in n1ind the rule that the
clas.sification upon whirh a Sunday closing law
is based is ·within the discretion of the legislative
branch and hence will be upheld unless clearly
arbitrary, it is difficult to conceive of a fair reason for some of the items excepted. It is readily
apparent that some of the execptions are clearly
based on necessity. But as to others, even considering the desirability of promoting recreational activity on Sunday, no fair reason suggests
itself as to why their sale .should be permitted
on Sunday while the sale of other commodities is
prohibited. Neither sporting equipment nor nursery products are such from the standpoint of the
buyer or seller that they cannot be purchased on
a week day, though it is the intention of the buyer
to use the equipment and plant the tree or flowers
on Sunday. Neither is it likely to deteriorate over
Saturday night or be depleted during Sunday.
Boxing gloves and baseball bats are at least as
stable as butter and bananas. The same may be
said of dentifrices and toiletries, tobacco and
beer. The classification being on a commodity
basis, it is arbitrary to permit the sale of a can
of beer on Sunday and prohibit the sale of a can
of orange juice or a can of coffee.''
In conformity with the above quotation, but conversely, it is logical to say, ''it is arbitrary to permit the
sale of a ca.n of orange juice or a can of coffee on Sunday and prohibit the sale of a cam of beer."
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CONCLUSION
By reason of the fact that the ordinance in question
is not designed to accomplish the purposes of a Sunday
closing law and is thus an illegal and unjustified extension
of the powers granted to municipal corporations by the
statutes of this state, and the fact that the court in making its decision read into the case evidence which was not
agreed to by the parties or adduced at the trial, and inasmuch as the ordinance is violative of provisions of the
Constitution of the State of Utah and of the Constitution
of the United States as hereinabove set forth, it is respectfully submitted that the ordinance in question is
invalid.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE
& McCULLOUGH
Atto.rneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
By:
Leland S. McCullough
of coun.sel
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